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AARON BAKER*
A Tale of Two Projects: Emerging Tension
between Public and Private Aspects of
Employment Discrimination Law
Abstract: Zeal for curing the public ill of discrimination can lead to approach-
es that ignore the more private concerns of individual victims of discrimination.
This article explains that the forward-looking project of changing society to
eliminate inequality is quite a different project from that of providing accessible
and effective individual remedies for discrimination victims. To that end, the
nature and divergence of these two projects is described in abstract terms, and
then concretely illustrated by reference to US employment discrimination law,
where a clear conflict has evolved between the two. The article then traces the
development of anti-discrimination law in Great Britain, and the subtly emerg-
ing tension between the two projects here. Finally, the article assesses the con-
temporary discourse on reform of equality law in Britain, and suggests how a
new single equality act might drive for social change without eroding the bene-
fits of the existing system for individual dispute resolution.
1. INTRODUCTION
Anti-discrimination law in Great Britain faces a period of dramatic change.
The UK government completed a consultation process, in November 2004,
on the creation of a new Commission for Equality and Human Rights
(‘CEHR’) to take over the enforcement of equality and human rights in
England, Scotland, and Wales; the consultation continues at the time of
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writing.1 The CEHR will have responsibility for administering new positive
duties to promote racial equality recently imposed on public bodies by the
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.2 It must also help enforce new reg-
ulations against sexual orientation and religion and belief discrimination in
the workplace, and pending regulations against age discrimination in
employment, on top of established prohibitions against race, sex, and dis-
ability discrimination in employment, education, and goods and services.3
This unification of enforcement responsibilities under the aegis of a single
agency could represent the first step in a move towards a single equality act,
called for by several leading commentators to harmonise the often conflict-
ing strains of the UK’s piecemeal approach to regulating discrimination.4
Some see a single equality act as an opportunity to extend protection in edu-
cation, goods, and services to the new strands; others would add to that by
giving jurisdiction for all individual complaints of discrimination, even
those falling outside the sphere of employment, to the existing employment
tribunals.5 This pressure to broaden and integrate equality law means that
tensions already present in employment law, between public policy imple-
mentation and dispute resolution, could foreshadow or even precipitate
developments across discrimination law well beyond employment. 
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1 Fairness for All: a New Commission for Equality and Human Rights, DTI, May 2004,
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/consultations/files/publication-1193.pdf> (‘CEHR White Paper’).
Government response to the CEHR White Paper Consultation, DTI, 18 November 2004
<http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk/equalityproject/consultation_govtresponse_
nov2004.doc>. The CEHR will take over the responsibilities of the existing Commission
for Racial Equality (CRE), Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), and Disability
Rights Commission (DRC). Northern Ireland has its own single equality body, the
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, which enforces a single equality act for
Northern Ireland that could provide a template for a similar act in Great Britain. As this
paper focuses on the debate over a single equality act in England, Scotland, and Wales, the
arrangements for equality regulation in Northern Ireland will not receive direct attention. 
2 Ibid., p. 46.
3 Ibid., pp. 32-35.
4 See Why Does Britain Need a Single Equality Act? London, Equality and Diversity Forum,
2003, <http://www.equalitydiversityforum.org.uk/equact.htm>; Which Way Equality?,
London, Commission for Racial Equality, 2002; Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human
Rights, Commission for Equality and Human Rights: Structure, Functions and Powers:
Eleventh Report of Session 2003-2004, London, HMSO, 2004; S. Fredman, Discrimination
Law, Oxford, OUP, 2002, pp. 91, 176-194 (‘Fredman’); C. Barnard and B. Hepple,
‘Substantive Equality’, CLJ, Vol. 59, 2000, p. 562; A. McColgan (ed.), Achieving Equality
at Work, London, IER, 2003, pp. 133-134; C. O’Cinneide, Taking Equal Opportunities
Seriously: the Extension of Positive Duties to Promote Equality, London, Equality and
Diversity Forum, 2004, pp. 6-13 (Seriously); G. Moon, Why do we need a Single Equality
Act?, London, Justice, February 2003.
5 Ibid.; B. Hepple, M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework – The
Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation, Oxford,
Hart, 2000, rec. 41 (‘Hepple Report’).
Now is the time, as the CEHR takes shape and debate on the content
of a single equality act intensifies, to address emerging conflicts in the
present system for enforcing employment discrimination law. The reform
discussion must answer a central question of how many tasks a new act
should ask employment tribunals to perform. If a single equality act will
impose new pressures on the employment tribunals, it becomes crucially
important that the reform discourse recognise the existence and nature of
the two projects whose ends the tribunals serve. The first project is that
of providing cheap, quick, and accessible remedies to individual victims
of discrimination. This ‘dispute resolution project’ differs markedly in
aims and justification from the second project – the ‘social change proj-
ect’ – which seeks through anti-discrimination regulation, among other
methods, to bring about structural change in society, specifically the
elimination of inequality.6 Both projects are part of a scheme for dealing
with discrimination as a social ill. However, the dispute resolution proj-
ect focuses on the primarily private matter of one individual seeking
compensation from another individual or institution for the commission
of a wrong. The social change project, on the other hand, concerns itself
with the essentially public matter of implementing a social policy against
discrimination. These two projects often work in harmony, and each nec-
essarily contributes to the mission of the other. However, the projects can
also find themselves in tension, and probably will if the new CEHR pur-
sues a strong strategy of deterrent litigation in tribunals already reeling
from expanded jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the existence and potential
inconsistency of these two projects has received little attention in recent
scholarship on the reform of discrimination regulation.7
Ignoring the distinct nature and aims of the two projects could lead to
erosion of the speed, affordability, and accessibility of discrimination deci-
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6 O. Fiss, ‘Forms of Justice’, Harvard LR, Vol. 93, 1979, p. 1. The concept of the two proj-
ects is the author’s invention, but it is underpinned by O. Fiss’s distinction between the
‘dispute resolution’ and ‘structural reform’ functions of adjudication.
7 There has been extensive discussion in recent years at the international level about mak-
ing enforcement institutions accessible and effective for victims of discrimination, but
it takes place in the context of developing primarily aspirational norms to guide nation-
al enforcement. See, e.g. Mc. Crudden, ‘International and European Norms Regarding
National Legal Remedies for Racial Inequality’ in S. Fredman (ed.), Discrimination and
Human Rights. The Case of Racism. Oxford, OUP, 2001. These norms have not found
many mainstream voices in the domestic debate. 
Examples of important reform contributions that pay little attention to the two projects
include H. Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’, Mod. Law Rev., Vol.
66, 2003, p. 16; C. O’Cinneide, A Single Equality Body: Lessons from Abroad, Manchester,
EOC, 2003 (‘O’Cinneide’); A. McColgan, n. 4 supra; CEHR White Paper, n. 1 supra; S.
Fredman, n. 4 supra, Hepple Report, n. 5 supra.
sions before employment tribunals. The threat comes in the form of calls
for measures intended to improve the effectiveness of tribunal litigation as
a tool of policy implementation, such as intensified equality commission
strategic litigation, class or representative actions and exemplary damages.8
There can be no doubt that UK employment discrimination law needs to
strengthen its impact on the structural causes of inequality. However, tin-
kering with the inputs to the system of tribunal claims, with an eye toward
improving its deterrent outputs, will almost certainly have effects on its
individual remedy function as well. It may well be that a significant, nega-
tive impact on the availability of individual relief is a price we are willing
to pay for stronger deterrence, but some measures in support of the social
change project are more likely to harm the dispute resolution project than
others. The reform discourse must deliberate more carefully on whether the
employment tribunal system, as presently constituted, should be the forum
for the more popular modern policy implementation methods.
I do not argue against increasing the deterrent impact of anti-discrim-
ination law or against the use of modern enforcement methods – I favour
both. Instead, I seek to point out some of the unintended consequences such
approaches might have for individual dispute resolution in the tribunals and
to encourage consideration of alternative strategies or forums. To demon-
strate the significance of the two projects to the current reform context,
Section 2 analyses the nature of the two projects, and how they can con-
flict. Section 3 illustrates this conflict by using the United States as an
example. The section begins by explaining why the US experience can shed
light on a British problem set in a European context. It then argues that US
failure to reconcile the two projects has left most individual victims with-
out a public forum for their claims, and has provoked the evolution of an
active dispute resolution movement often at odds with social change aims.
Section 4 analyses the evolution of employment discrimination law in
Great Britain in light of that example, with special attention to the role of
tribunal claims in the scheme for combating inequality in the workplace.
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8 M. Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, Oxford, OUP, 2002, pp. 183-
190; P. Skidmore, ‘The EC Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment;
Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-Discrimination Policy?’ ILJ, Vol. 30, 2001,
p. 126; C. McCrudden, D. Smith, and C. Brown, Racial Justice At Work: Enforcement of
the Race Relations Act 1976 in Employment, London, Policy Studies Institute, 1991, pp.
281-282 (‘McCrudden et al.’); L. Dickens, ‘Anti-discrimination Legislation: Exploring
and Explaining the Impact on Women’s Employment’ in W. McCarthy (ed.), Legal
Intervention in Industrial Relations: Gains and Losses, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, pp.
121-123; A. Leonard, Judging Inequality: the Effectiveness of the Tribunal System in Sex
Discrimination and Equal Pay Cases, London, Cobden Trust, 1987, pp. 141-145; S.
Fredman, n. 4 supra, pp. 174; B. Hepple Report, n. 5 supra, rec. 44.
This reveals some worrying parallels with the US experience, and sets up
an assessment, in Section 5, of the contemporary reform discourse in Great
Britain, focusing on the lack of attention the two projects receive in the
British debate. The article concludes by recommending directions for a sin-
gle equality act that could avoid the tension between the two projects. 
2. THE NATURE AND DIVERGENCE OF THE TWO PROJECTS
2.1. The Two Projects
The idea that society’s response to employment discrimination consists of
(at least) two separate projects has not received much attention, so surely
some readers will ask what makes them ‘projects’. One could describe a
scheme for dealing with discrimination as involving various ‘elements’ or
‘functions’, all of which need attention according to their relative status in
the policy priorities. Providing mechanisms for individuals to redress acts
of discrimination against them might merely make up one of the arrows in
the quiver of a robust approach to combating discrimination as a social
problem. However, that view ignores the inherent value placed on the
availability of a forum for the individual to vindicate his or her rights. If a
hypothetical equality regime employs two independent measures – say,
public procurement contract compliance and equality commission inves-
tigations of suspected patterns or practices – and a review of the system
indicates that the two do not work well together, it might be proper to cur-
tail or eliminate one of the programmes, if that would make the fight
against discrimination more effective. Nobody would miss the lost or lim-
ited programme, provided the overall social change aims moved forward.
In this example, contract compliance has no essential social worth other
than its instrumental value as a tool for policy implementation. 
On the other hand, the availability of formal, public adjudication to
the effect that one person has wronged another has value for reasons that
go beyond its role in delivering a broader policy outcome. Indeed, the
accustomed form of adjudication in common-law countries evolved from
a demand by the wronged for a venue to air their grievances, to receive
public recognition of their status as ‘the wronged’, and to have the wrong-
doer identified as such.9 This separate worth of the right to an individual
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9 K. Laster and P. O’Malley, ‘Sensitive New-age Laws: The Reassertion of Emotionality
in Law’, IJ Soc. of Law, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 21, 23-24; see also, N. Bohler-Muller, ‘What
Equality Courts Can Learn from Gilligan’s Ethic of Care: A Novel Approach’, SAJHR,
Vol. 16, 2000, p. 623.
remedy subsists even where the legal entitlement to relief came into exis-
tence solely to advance social change objectives. Once government
grants justiciable rights among private parties as a policy implementation
measure, it releases something it cannot altogether control. It retains the
prerogative to augment the right, or to add other programmes or measures
to its overall scheme, but the right is now out there and cannot easily be
retracted. The obvious political unpalatability of canceling a right is
heightened with rights such as equality, where granting a right of action
actually recognised a substantive right already deemed to exist.10 In
short, individual rights of action have a life of their own outside the poli-
cies they advance.
An interesting question arises – which must be left for subsequent
empirical and theoretical study – as to (a) what, essentially, we value
about the right to seek a judgment in our favour and (b) what functions
ought to be served by the institution of individual claims for compensa-
tion. ‘Compensation’ provides one obvious answer to both questions.
There is increasing acknowledgement, however, of the role of public dis-
pute resolution in healing important community relationships,11 clearing
one’s name,12 or enhancing inclusion or democratic participation.13
Public hearings leading to public declarations of responsibility deliver
benefits that compensation secured through mediation, conciliation, or
even arbitration cannot.14 It is true that these forms of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) owe much of their popularity to the fact that they
relieve the participants of several obvious disadvantages of public litiga-
tion, such as cost, delay, antagonism, legalism, and the stress attendant to
each of those characteristics.15 However, as this article argues, many of
those disadvantages exist in their present degree because the objective of
quick, cheap, and accessible remedies has not received the priority it
deserves. Moreover, the point here is not that public hearings are the only
desirable way of resolving discrimination claims, but that even a system
replete with attractive ADR options must have as its backdrop an acces-
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10 See, e.g. the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
11 See, e.g. N. Bohler-Muller, n. 9 supra, pp. 627-632; O. Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’, Yale
LJ, Vol. 93, 1984, pp. 1073, 1085-1088 (‘Against Settlement’). 
12 Routes to Resolution: Consultation Document on Proposals for Employment Act 2002
(Dispute Resolution) Regulations, London, DTI, July 2003, para. 2:11 (Routes). 
13 Modernising Justice-the Government’s Plans for Reforming Legal Fairness and the
Courts, London, Lord Chancellor’s Department, 1998, Foreword; S. Fredman, n. 4
supra, pp. 22-23, 181-182.
14 See, e.g. ‘Against Settlement’, n. 11 supra, pp. 1076-1078.
15 See A. Baker, ‘Access v. Process in Employment Discrimination: Why ADR Suits the US
but not the UK’, ILJ, Vol. 31, 2002, p. 113 (‘Access v. Process’); A. Leonard, n. 8 supra.
sible public forum. True vindication of a right calls for more than a pay-
out from the person who violates that right: it requires at least a realistic
choice of a public airing of the grievance and an assessment of fault.
2.2. Their Divergence
Clearly, if the two projects value dispute resolution for different reasons,
a dissonance can arise. The potential for conflict becomes apparent upon
consideration of what it means to engage in the dispute resolution proj-
ect (DRP) or the social change project (SCP). Participation in the SCP
involves seeking, and implementing, answers to the question, ‘how do we
best discourage employers from discriminating (or encourage practices
consistent with substantive equality)?’This overarching question can lead
to more specialised questions about tribunal procedure or damages reme-
dies, but the answers will always turn on what approach best suits social
change objectives. The DRP, on the other hand, asks, ‘how do we make
the process of seeking redress for wrongs – and of defending such peti-
tions – less of a miserable, discouraging, and ultimately pointless experi-
ence for the parties?’ or something to that effect. The DRP answers ques-
tions about procedure or remedies with an eye toward what will make
things easy or fair for the parties – claimants and respondents. Thus, for
example, a classic DRP concern with quiet, private resolution would tend
to conflict with a SCP interest in sending deterrent messages to society.16
The fact that the two projects can conflict should not obscure the fact
that they often interrelate. Distinguishing between the two projects does
not mean that every aspect of equality law falls into the category of pur-
suing one project or the other. For example, individual claims affect the
behaviour of respondents, sometimes causing them to rethink their
employment policies, and thus dispute resolution obviously impacts on
social change.17 Similarly, successful test cases in aid of the SCP educate
the judiciary and provide clarification of the law, potentially making dis-
pute resolution more straightforward. The removal of limits on compen-
sation awards has SCP and DRP aspects, giving litigation more deterrent
bite as well as allowing compensation awards to reflect all of the harm suf-
fered by the victim. Indeed, whether an argument for higher damages has
an SCP or a DRP flavour depends on the reasons offered in support: the
SCP argument cites deterrence while the DRP argument refers to appro-
priate compensation. For this reason the two projects cannot serve as
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16 ‘Against Settlement’, n. 11 supra, p. 1074 and fn. 9.
17 B. Hepple Report, n. 5 supra, app. 1. 
labels for individual commentators or even for particular proposals.
Instead, ‘SCP’ and ‘DRP’ categorise purposes for which to advance a giv-
en proposal, and the justifications used in support of it. Therefore the rea-
son for delineating the two projects is not to identify two very separate
camps, or schools of thought, or even kinds of approach to regulating dis-
crimination, but to help understand why some of the things reformers
want to do for one purpose might have negative effects on the ability of
the regulatory system to serve the other purpose. In a sense, as the US
example below indicates, the DRP represents a reaction – a very appro-
priate and useful reaction – to SCP approaches that threaten the continued
availability of an accessible, user-friendly dispute resolution system.
3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TWO PROJECTS IN THE US
The arrangements in the US for resolving employment discrimination dis-
putes, and for imposing deterrent pressure in aid of systemic and struc-
tural change, illustrate how the two projects can pull in different direc-
tions. The value of this illustration flows not from the similarity of the US
system to that of Great Britain – they are very different – but from the sim-
ilar trajectories, over time, of their social change models. Both have
moved roughly from a model depending almost exclusively on individual
claims to apply pressure for change, to one that focuses more on the strate-
gic sending of deterrent messages.18 This section will therefore first
explain the relevance of the US experience to a reform debate shaped
increasingly by EC law and policy, and then outline the causes and conse-
quences of the evolving conflict between the two projects in the US.
3.1. Why Consider the US?
There are two obvious objections to looking to the US for insight into
issues raised by a single equality act for Great Britain. The first is that the
British problem exists within a European context of regulation under EC
Article 13, the directives already and soon to be issued under its author-
ity, and the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This means
that the debate over the appropriate approach to promoting equality can-
not proceed exclusively on a UK level, which limits the value of a US-
GB comparison. The second objection is that the existing institutional
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18 See A. Baker, ‘Effective Deterrence v Accessible Remedies: What Not to Borrow from
US Discrimination Law’, IJD & L, Vol. 6, 2004, p. 109, and Section 4 infra.
and substantive arrangements in the US and GB differ too much for US
developments to yield any useful lessons. The first objection cannot be
explained away, but must be accepted, and the limitations that flow from
it understood and used to modify any suggestions provoked by the US
illustration. The second objection, on the other hand, simply overstates
the case.
Although EC law and policy must perforce have a far-reaching influ-
ence on the objectives and substance of a single equality act, for Great
Britain or for any EU Member State, it cannot and should not dictate the
precise arrangements for delivery of either individual rights vindication
or policy implementation. It can and does prescribe certain minimum
standards for remedies in individual cases,19 and it has required and will
require the imposition of duties, the creation or empowerment of enforce-
ment bodies, and the adoption of specific approaches to proof of dis-
crimination.20 However, the Member States generally enjoy broad discre-
tion in choosing their means of implementing the law flowing from
Article 13, and have adopted a wide variety of different arrangements for
dispute resolution and anti-discrimination enforcement.21 Of course,
beyond the legal constraints of EU membership there is the fact that the
anti-discrimination discourse increasingly takes place at a European lev-
el, not just at member state level. The adoption of Article 13 has given
rise, over the last several years, to a rich literature dealing with questions
such as what Europe means by ‘equality’, how to implement the EC pol-
icy against discrimination, and how to assure effective remedies for vio-
lation of EC rights.22 Nevertheless, no matter how many questions about
the substance and procedure of equality regulation are settled at a
European level, there will remain important questions, especially proce-
durally and institutionally, that Great Britain must resolve for itself. In
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19 See, e.g. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority
(Marshall II), [1993] ECR I-3313.
20 See, e.g. Council Directive No. 2000/43 on the implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (O.J. 2000, L180/22).
21 See, e.g. C. Kilpatrick, ‘Emancipation through Law or Emasculation of Law? The
Nation-State, the EU, and Gender Equality at Work’ in J. Conaghan, R. Fischl, and K.
Klare (eds.) Labour Law in an Era of Globalization, Oxford, OUP, 2002, pp. 489, 505-
509; K. Berthou, ‘New Hopes for French Anti-Discrimination Law’, IJCLLIR, Vol. 19,
2003, pp. 109-137; T. Havinga, ‘The effects and limits of anti-discrimination law in The
Netherlands’, IJ Soc. of Law, Vol. 30, 2002, pp. 75-90.
22 C. McCrudden, ‘The New Concept of Equality’, a paper for the Academy of European
Law Conference: Fight Against Discrimination: The Race and Framework Employment
Directives, Trier, 2-3 June 2003; S. S. Fredman, ‘Equality: A New Generation?’ ILJ, Vol.
30, 2001, pp. 145, 163-167 (‘Generation’); C. Barnard & Hepple, n. 4 supra; M. Bell,
n. 8 supra.
light of the fact that in many respects Britain’s legal system resembles
that of the US far more than those of its civil law European neighbours,
study of the US can still shed useful light on many issues. Those issues
include, among others, the following subjects of this article: (1) the insti-
tutional arrangements that GB will make for the vindication of individ-
ual equality rights (GB or EC) and (2) the approach GB will take to
enforcing equality policy (within the loose parameters set by EC law). 
Some characteristics of the US system, however, might appear to
make its experience unhelpful as a predictor of similar problems in the
UK. For example, the single equality body in the US, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), has exclusive, original
jurisdiction of all federal employment discrimination claims, and US dis-
crimination lawsuits call for resolution by jury trial in the US federal
courts, which resemble the UK High Court more than British employ-
ment tribunals. These differences do not, however, make US develop-
ments irrelevant to Britain. Even without the delay represented by a
mandatory EEOC stage, US discrimination lawsuits take at least 18
months from filing to conclusion – three times the usual duration of a UK
tribunal claim.23 Nothing inherent in the tribunals prevents delays from
lengthening to US dimensions if formality and stakes continue to
increase: UK equal pay cases already experience US-style delays because
of the stakes involved (see section 4.4 infra). Also, even without exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the British equality commissions participate in a greater
proportion of discrimination claims in the tribunals than does the EEOC
in the federal courts (see section 4.3 infra). The differences between the
US federal courts and the GB tribunals owe more to what has been
expected of them than to any immutable characteristics. The point in
looking at the US is that Britain – and indeed Europe–  has begun to
expect from the tribunals and commissions what the US has long expect-
ed from the EEOC-federal court system. What follows seeks to explain
how those expectations affected the remedial arrangements in the US, in
order to illuminate the possible impacts of similar expectations in Britain. 
3.2. The US Story
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 formed the bedrock of US
employment discrimination law, prohibiting workplace discrimination on 
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23 A. Baker, n. 18 supra; J. MacMillan, ‘Employment Tribunals: Philosophies and
Practicalities’, ILJ, Vol. 28, 2000, pp. 33, 45-46.
the grounds of race, gender, and religion.24 The original mechanism for
enforcement of those prohibitions was the individual claim for compen-
sation, brought by aggrieved employees to the EEOC in the first
instance.25 Dispute resolution project voices at the time called for the
EEOC to have adjudicative powers, to resolve disputes quickly and
cheaply, but this was the first of several policy decisions that advanced
social change at the expense of dispute resolution.26 The EEOC received
exclusive jurisdiction over all employment discrimination claims, and its
job was to investigate, where appropriate accuse, and seek conciliation of
claims or, failing that, give claimants permission to pursue a private law-
suit in the US Federal District Courts.27 The creators of this system
thought that the EEOC would conciliate most claims, and that lawsuits in
the federal courts would be a last resort.28
Not long after the enactment of Title VII it became clear that the sys-
tem imposed little meaningful pressure on employers, and that the EEOC,
strapped by limited funding, could not hope to conciliate more than a frac-
tion of the claims it received. To deal with the problem, the EEOC
received the power to take on claims in its own name, meaning that if a
claim appeared to have strategic importance in the fight against discrimi-
nation, the EEOC could take the place of the claimant, and pursue the law-
suit in the federal courts seeking injunctive and monetary relief extending
far beyond compensation to the original claimant.29 The EEOC adopted a
policy of not really trying to conciliate even most of the claims brought
before it, focusing instead on the strongest claims, from which it could
select those it would prosecute in its own name.30 This led to a state of
affairs where most employment discrimination claimants received nothing
from the EEOC but a six-month delay and the right to file a federal law-
suit, while the EEOC scored high-profile victories against large corpora-
tions yielding damages counted in the millions of dollars.31
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24 42 USC s 2000e-5 ff; 42 USC s 1981; age and disability discrimination were prohibit-
ed in 1967 and 1991 respectively (29 USC s 621 ff; 42 USC s 12101 ff.
25 42 USC s 2000e-5(e).
26 2 [1964] US Cong & Adm News, pp. 2515-16.
27 See An Evaluation of the EEOC Mediation Program, Washington, EEOC, 1999,
<http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/chapter4.html (EEOC Mediation)>.
28 See EEOC Mediation, n. 27 supra; 2 [1964] US Cong & Adm News, pp. 2404, 2515-16. 
29 The Equal Opportunities Act of 1972.
30 EEOC Mediation, n. 27 supra.
31 EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, Washington, EEOC, 2000, <http://www.
eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/index.html>; M. Green, ‘Debunking the Myth of Employer
Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims’, Rutgers LJ,
Vol. 31, 2000, p. 457.
The social change project won another policy victory in 1991. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 introduced the right to a jury trial in employ-
ment discrimination cases, and the potential for punitive damages to be
awarded by juries, according to standards much less restrictive than
those prevailing in the UK for exemplary damages.32 It may not be
immediately clear how this harmed the dispute resolution project
beyond having the EEOC’s attention turned away from garden variety
individual claims. Surely, one might think, higher damages and more
generous granters thereof must have helped the individual plaintiff.
However, punitive damages and profligate juries would not help indi-
vidual plaintiffs who could not afford to bring a case to judgment, and
the higher stakes they represented excluded even more claimants than
before from a formal hearing.
This exclusion occurred because higher stakes meant more and bet-
ter lawyers, more legalism, more procedural manoeuvring, more work
for the courts and the EEOC, and more time and expense for claimants
and their lawyers.33 Attractive remedies brought more claims to the
EEOC, which could thus give its attention to an even smaller percentage
of claims than before. Because all claims carried the potential for cata-
strophic damages, defendants involved their lawyers much more at early
stages, such as EEOC investigation or conciliation, leading to more work
and delay. Once cases came to court, corporate counsel used every pro-
cedural mechanism available to delay and thwart the plaintiff ’s or the
EEOC’s case – any amount of legal expense can be justified when puni-
tive damages lurk in the background. The bigger the award the greater
the publicity, causing the courts to proceed with greater caution, making
certain not to deprive the defendant – at risk, potentially, of bankruptcy
and shame – of appropriate procedural safeguards. All of these develop-
ments served the social change project quite well: the legal talent invest-
ed, the care exercised by the institutions, and the natural selection of
strong cases tended to result in the sending of clear, forceful, and con-
sidered messages. From a dispute resolution perspective, though, it all
made the game too expensive and drawn out for most claimants to par-
ticipate. 
Predictably, the changes of 1991 accelerated the exclusion of most
employment discrimination victims from any formal avenue of relief. By
the end of the 1990s, the EEOC only investigated a small minority of
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claims, and the rest were contracted out to mediation or ignored.34 By
2000, over 97 per cent of claimants left the EEOC process with nothing
more than a letter authorising them to bring a federal lawsuit; little more
than two per cent of these claimants ever got to trial.35 This number con-
sists almost exclusively of those able to attract legal representation on the
basis of their relatively high pay.36 Thus, only a tiny minority of discrim-
ination victims in the US – usually management level employees – get to
try their chances with a judge or jury.
3.3. The Role of ADR in the US
The practical unavailability of a formal judicial remedy to nearly all indi-
vidual victims of employment discrimination in the US has caused an
exodus to private dispute resolution. Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) methods have become the preferred means of dealing with
employment discrimination claims in the US. Mediation, always avail-
able privately, is offered by the EEOC to around half of all claimants, and
every district of the US federal courts has a mandatory ADR service for
discrimination claims, usually involving mediation.37 Although any
appropriately flexible dispute resolution system should employ media-
tion or some variant, like ACAS conciliation, as one of several options,
mediation in the US occurs against a backdrop of no meaningful judicial
alternative for most employees. It is used not only by those who prefer a
quick, negotiated settlement and, perhaps, a renewal of cordial relations
with their employer, but by those who would prefer an objective finding
of wrongdoing and a legally deserved – not negotiated on the basis of
likely litigation costs, chances of success, and bargaining strengths of the
parties – award of compensation. For most victims mediation represents
the only chance of any result of any kind.
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36 A. Baker, n. 18 supra; Maltby, n. 35 supra, pp. 47, 57; W. Howard, ‘Arbitrating Claims of
Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?’
Disp Res J, Oct.-Dec. 1995, p. 40, 40-49; E. Hill, ‘AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair
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37 EEOC Mediation, n. 27 supra. 
An exception to this rule exists for signatories of pre-dispute manda-
tory arbitration agreements (arbitration agreements).38 Those who sign
arbitration agreements generally do so as a prerequisite to employment,
agreeing thereby to submit any dispute with their employer, including dis-
crimination, to binding, final arbitration.39 Employers – an important driv-
ing force in the US dispute resolution project – use these agreements to
keep down litigation costs, and the courts enforce them.40 Their populari-
ty keeps growing, and a good estimate has almost a third of private-sector
employees bound by an arbitration agreement.41 Thus, claimants turn to
mediation as an alternative to nothing, and to arbitration because their jobs
depend on it. The US appetite for ADR bears a much greater resemblance
to starvation than to the gourmand’s choice of delicacies from a buffet.
Owing to the US dependence on ADR, it emerges as one of the flash-
points in the conflict between the two projects in the US: both sides talk
about ADR, but they have different ideas about its best form and func-
tion. The dispute resolution project tends to see arbitration agreements as
the only way a working-class claimant can get a hearing and a decision
on his or her claim.42 Social change project adherents tend to oppose the
use of mandatory arbitration because it limits the deterrent pressure that
the EEOC and private attorneys general can bring to bear through dra-
matic court successes.43 If fully enforced, arbitration agreements assure
that roughly a third of private-sector employees will not (a) become ‘pri-
vate attorneys general’ or (b) bring claims to the EEOC to choose which
ones to champion for its strategic ends. The SCP prefers non-binding
mediation, a process where the claimant always has (theoretical) recourse
to the EEOC or court.
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Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink
in the Process’, U Penn JLEL, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 76, 137-138.
Depicting the full texture and nuance of the US arbitration debate
exceeds the aims of this article, but the significance of it here flows from
the direct opposition of the two projects over this issue. Civil rights advo-
cates, academics, and policymakers who see themselves as fighting dis-
crimination by supporting the availability of a cheap, quick, accessible
forum in arbitration (as well as employers, who see themselves as trying
to save money) array themselves against other civil rights advocates, aca-
demics, and policymakers who see themselves as fighting discrimination
by maximising the opportunities for deterrent message sending.44 The
two sides do not oppose each other’s objectives, but oppose the mutually
exclusive means of attaining them. The EEOC, in condemning arbitration
agreements for depriving the courts of an opportunity to clarify the pub-
lic policy on discrimination, does not actually begrudge the $25,000-a-
year worker the relatively cheap and accessible forum of arbitration,
which is the only avenue of rights vindication realistically on offer. Yet its
argument would have that effect, given that the only way that worker will
get an opportunity to arbitrate is through signing an enforceable pre-dis-
pute agreement. It is because the dispute resolution system is viewed as
the single, integrated mechanism for meeting the ends of both projects
that the two projects must fight over its use. 
The dire situation of the typical US discrimination victim, and the con-
flict between the two projects on arbitration and other issues, both owe their
existence to the following historical facts. The original model for social
change granted (or recognised) a right not to be discriminated against. It
used the vindication of that right as the means of applying pressure for
change, until it was believed that this approach applied insufficient pres-
sure. Then it was decided to use the process designed for the vindication of
individual rights to do far more than vindicate individual rights. As soon as
the social change project began using the dispute resolution system for
more than mere dispute resolution, a conflict emerged, and the circum-
stances described in the preceding paragraphs developed. All of these facts
have happened or might happen in Britain, as will be discussed below. The
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point of tracing parallels between the US and GB experiences is not to sup-
port a prediction that Britain will inevitably follow the same path as the US.
Instead, the comparison seeks to demonstrate that Great Britain has good
reasons to pay more attention to the emerging tension between the two
projects, and that it is by no means too late to do so. 
4. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TWO PROJECTS IN GREAT BRITAIN
When the UK government first announced its plans to improve on the
existing work of three anti-discrimination agencies, the Commission for
Racial Equality (CRE), the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), and
the Disability Rights Commission (DRC), by forming the new CEHR, its
stated aim was to ‘tackle barriers to participation and change culture’,45
through the use of ‘a strategic, modern approach to enforcement of equal-
ity legislation, supported by up to date enforcement tools’.46 The move to
‘modern’, ‘up to date’ approaches follows an historic trend away from
enforcing anti-discrimination law exclusively through individual claims.
Tracing that trend, the following sections analyse, in turn, the original
blueprint for employment discrimination regulation in Britain, the role of
the tribunals, the role of the equality commissions, the effect of rising
stakes in discrimination cases, and the emergence of a British dispute res-
olution movement.
4.1. The Early Social Change Model
The first British anti-discrimination model focused almost exclusively on
dispute resolution.47 The Race Relations Act 1965 created the Race
Relations Board (RRB), which had responsibility for resolving com-
plaints of race discrimination. This first UK effort at regulating discrim-
ination consciously avoided relying on courts or even employment 
tribunals, and the RRB itself, through its local conciliation committees,
adjudicated all claims. The Race Relations Act 1968 sought to strengthen
the RRB’s enforcement role through court enforcement of RRB orders,
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but the focus remained exclusively on providing ‘for the peaceful and
orderly adjustment of grievances and the release of tensions’.48
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) and the Race Relations Act
1976 (RRA) wrought extensive reform of this model. Parliament had
behind it a decade of pure dispute resolution to demonstrate that resolv-
ing disputes alone does not change the underlying structures of discrim-
ination. During consultation on the SDA, it became clear that having
enforcement activity depend on individual complaints deprived that
activity of any strategic coherence, flowing as it did from essentially ran-
dom individual decisions to act.49 The White Paper preceding the passage
of the RRA explained, ‘although it is necessary for the law to provide
effective remedies for the individual victim it is also essential that the
application of the law should not depend on the making of an individual
complaint.’50 This concern led to the SDA and RRA keeping agency
enforcement separate from individual claims.51
The government wanted to strengthen the impact of the legislation
on the conduct of the regulated, and the EOC and CRE emerged in
response to this concern, as an intentional choice not to pursue the US
‘private attorney general’ approach.52 The SDA and RRA actually gave
institutional recognition to the separateness of individual justice and
social change objectives. They gave resolution of employment disputes to
the industrial (now employment) tribunals – no agencies need be
involved. The EOC and the CRE would have two separate responsibili-
ties: to help with individual claims and to pursue an enforcement strate-
gy to bring about change.53 Thus, Britain did not set out to pursue the
social change project exclusively through a dispute resolution model.
4.2. The Tribunals as Quintessential Dispute Resolution Forums
The SDA and RRA did not initially cast the employment tribunals in the
rôle of forums for social change. Indeed, one could hardly look at the tri-
bunals of the 1970s and think, ‘this is where equality will become a real-
ity.’ Until the 1971 advent of the action for unfair dismissal, the tribunals
handled a small range of matters such as entitlement to assessments from
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pp. 236, 238.
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51 Applebey & Ellis, n. 49 supra, pp. 238-239.
52 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
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the Industrial Training Act 1964, or payments under the Redundancy
Payments Act 1965.54 The tribunals consisted of a ‘chairman’ – legally
trained, and more specifically trained to handle employment matters –
and two lay members with some industrial experience, one chosen from
a pool vetted by employers, the other from a pool vetted by labour repre-
sentatives.55 This arrangement sought to give effect, going forward, to a
long tradition in the UK of voluntary labour-management dispute resolu-
tion.56 Disputes were to be resolved on the basis of industrial justice, not
complex legal rules, and the goal was the peaceful adjustment of griev-
ances and maintenance of an ongoing productive relationship.57 It has
been said that the sole purpose of labour tribunals the world over is to
answer the question, ‘can they do that to me?’58 The industrial tribunals
of the mid-1970s were certainly no exception. 
The decision to give individual discrimination claims to the tribunals
drew in part from the ‘Donovan Report’, which hailed the tribunals, as it
saw them in 1968, as ‘easily accessible, informal, speedy, and inexpen-
sive.’59 In those days, it was not obvious that anything significant distin-
guished the task of deciding whether a dismissal was based on race from
the task of deciding whether the same dismissal was procedurally unfair,
or whether a redundancy payment should issue. According to one tribu-
nal chairman,
Donovan [of the Report] cannot possibly have contemplated that
a chairman sitting alone should be called upon to disapply pro-
visions of UK law, having first determined the interaction
between UK and European substantive law, procedural and juris-
dictional time limits in a handful of test cases representing some
40,000 applicants with claims said to be worth in excess of
£100m with 11 counsel, including three silks, addressing him on
pure questions of law, over five days.60
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It is almost certain that Parliament did not, in sending employment dis-
crimination claims to the tribunals, expect anything of the kind either.
Early on, discrimination claims constituted a small fraction of the tri-
bunal caseload, and tended to involve moderate awards to often unrepre-
sented claimants.61 The stakes were not high enough to justify too much
expensive legal representation, and the EOC and CRE only infrequently
appeared to push the social change project. The social change efforts of
the commissions were intended, in the beginning, to focus primarily on
formal investigations of discriminatory practices. 
4.3. The Commissions Take Policy Implementation into the Tribunals
As it turned out, agency pusillanimity and evisceration of the formal
investigation power by the courts left the commissions with strategic lit-
igation as their strongest weapon for social change. Formal investigations
should have applied effective law enforcement pressure through what are
called ‘named’ or ‘belief’ investigations.62 Through this mechanism a
commission can investigate named individuals (e.g. companies, public
authorities) if it has a belief that they have committed an unlawful act.63
The SDA and RRA intended that the EOC and CRE prosecute their
strategic law enforcement aims through these investigations and resultant
‘non-discrimination notices’,64 but the courts and investigation respon-
dents did not cooperate. 
The two commissions had different experiences, but the outcomes
for each were much the same. The CRE, in the first two years of its exis-
tence, leapt out of the gate with 47 formal investigations, 24 of which
involved employment. By 1984 only 14 had been concluded; from 1985-
1992 only four investigations into employment discrimination were com-
pleted; by 1998 only a single additional employment discrimination
investigation came to a close.65 The EOC, meanwhile, never showed a
real commitment to use its investigation powers, and by 1990 had issued 
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only four non-discrimination notices.66 Although space forbids a proper
discussion of why this happened, the simple version is that (a) the targets
of the investigations responded with every legal challenge imaginable,
and (b) a series of decisions in the early 1980s, by courts uncomfortable
with this new law enforcement tool, ‘virtually eradicated the investigative
powers of the commissions.’67 Companies and institutions take up a very
defensive and lawyer-rich stance when on the receiving end of law
enforcement activities by government agencies. The targets of formal
investigations in the late 1970s and early 1980s proved no exception, and
they found sympathetic listeners in the House of Lords.68 Successful
challenges rendered the investigation process so complex, costly and
slow that formal investigations are hardly used by any commission today,
and strategic efforts have turned to other outlets.
With their formal investigation power thus hobbled, the commissions
could be forgiven for turning to strategic litigation. This transpired, more
or less, with the EOC,69 but the CRE has increased its emphasis on strate-
gic litigation only in the last decade, after a long period of attempting to
assist all meritorious cases that could not proceed without its help.70 In the
early 1980s the Commission gave representation to roughly a fifth of
those who applied for support at the tribunals.71 By 1998 that proportion
had been cut in half.72 The EOC finds itself in roughly the same position
as the CRE, although it never really digressed into playing a strong dis-
pute resolution role. The EOC has consistently focused on promotion and
taking strategic test cases, and has had some success with this approach.73
It does support individual cases at tribunals, but has consistently support-
ed a smaller percentage of applicants than has the CRE.74 Nevertheless,
the CRE, the EOC and the more recently created DRC have had an impor-
tant impact in the tribunals. The presence of the commissions has created
a two-tiered claim system, in that those who receive agency assistance or 
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representation fare better than those who do not.75 Applicants represented
by a commission win almost twice as often as other applicants, including
those with legal representation, who win almost twice as often as those
without.76
It is important to note in this regard that despite agencies in Britain
taking cases ‘selectively’, they have a greater presence in the tribunals
than the EEOC has in the US federal courts. Although over 20 per cent
of UK employment discrimination claims get to a hearing as compared to
roughly two or three per cent in the US, the British commissions feature
in a larger percentage (14 per cent versus 12.5 per cent in the US) of that
less exclusive group of cases.77 This extensive law enforcement commit-
ment in the tribunals may reap strategic dividends but leaves 86 per cent
of claimants to settle for a second-class version of the process afforded
more ‘strategic’ victims. It will take much more than these pages can
accomplish to prove that EOC and CRE strategic litigation has increased
the time and expense of bringing a discrimination claim to a tribunal
hearing. However, the point has not been to prove that proposition, but to
suggest that agency strategic litigation has become an increasingly preva-
lent feature in the tribunals at the same time as the tribunals have become
more formal and therefore less accessible without legal representation.
Agency involvement in the tribunals is of course only one way in which
the stakes in tribunal claims have risen in the last decade. 
4.4. Rising Stakes in the Tribunals
A number of factors can produce heightened stakes in employment dis-
crimination litigation. Having a government agency prosecuting claims
certainly has that effect. Higher damages also raise stakes, as does rais-
ing the profile of a case, or multiplying the number of claimants
involved. Raised stakes make defendants spend money to defend their
position, and thus increase the time and expense of participating in a dis-
pute resolution process.78 The most striking example of this in Britain,
where class action suits in the US sense do not exist in the employment
sphere, is equal pay cases. 
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British protection against unequal pay for work of equal value (like
‘comparable worth’ in the US) involves complicated factual disputes as
to the relative value of particular jobs, and can involve, or at least poten-
tially affect, whole sections of a company’s workforce.79 Employer
respondents in such cases can have a great deal to lose, in that a decision
against them can require an increase in pay across a band of employees.
Respondents therefore have a strong incentive to apply expensive legal
muscle to wrangle over the highly technical questions upon which these
cases can turn. As a result, in 2000 for example, the average time for
completion of an equal value case in the UK was almost 20 months.80
According to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, such delay is ‘properly
described as scandalous and amount[s] to a denial of justice to women
through the judicial process.’81 The delay occasioned by these complaints
offers an excellent illustration of what happens when employers face
something close to a class action lawsuit, with multiple plaintiffs, a high
profile, a large potential downside, and plenty of room for technical or
legal manoeuvre. It also demonstrates that despite obvious institutional
differences between the tribunals and US federal courts, the wrong inputs
to an employment tribunal can produce an output – in terms of delay and
expense – that closely resembles what the US courts have to offer. Here,
the ‘wrong’ input is the class action-like scale of the litigation, but high
damages in general have had an impact across the full spectrum of UK
discrimination cases.
In the early 1990s the RRA and SDA schemes came under heavy
criticism for a variety of failings, among them the lack of a serious deter-
rent to discriminatory conduct. In addition to the failure of formal inves-
tigations to amount to a real threat, both statutes had caps limiting the
amount of damages available to the victims of employment discrimina-
tion. One commentator called the 1990 limit, of around £11,000, ‘deriso-
ry’, and bemoaned the system’s preference for ‘backward-looking com-
pensation’ over ‘forward-looking deterrent awards.’82 Others condemned
not only the statutory limits, but their superfluity: the vast majority of
awards came in well under the caps as long as the caps existed. It appears
that from the advent of the SDA and the RRA to the 1990s, there per-
sisted a judicial culture in the tribunals of awarding modest awards: from
1988 to 1989, 76 per cent of awards did not exceed £1,500 and only two
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claimants received over £8,000; from 1989 to 1990, 62 per cent of awards
fell short of £1,500, and only one person received more than £8,000.83
Such moderation in no way conflicted with the aims expressed in the
White Papers on the SDA and RRA – individual compensation was nev-
er intended as a significant source of pressure for change. However,
reformers who had given up on the defunct formal investigation began to
see enhanced in terrorem awards of compensation as the way forward for
social change.84
During the 1990s, the reformers began to get what they wanted.
Pursuant to an ECJ decision, the government removed the caps from
SDA cases in 1993 and from RRA cases in 1994.85 Average awards of
compensation, unsurprisingly, climbed markedly thereafter. By 2000, the
average award for disability discrimination was around £13,000, for race
around £13,700, and for sex around £9,500.86 Tribunal awards began ris-
ing to some extent immediately in 1994, and the commissions did what
they could to help loosen up even further a tribunal judiciary whose
meanness reflected its industrial justice roots, not the policy implemen-
tation role increasingly thrust upon it.87
As damages – and hence stakes – went up, lawyers became com-
monplace in the tribunals, and the duration and complexity of proceed-
ings increased. Although some commentators decried excessive juridifi-
cation of tribunals before damages caps were lifted,88 it was only after
damages began to rise that complaints regarding excessive delay and
legalism led, by 1997, to proposals for reform of tribunal procedure –
most notably in the Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998
(the 1998 Act).89 Although the correlation is admittedly anecdotal, the
delay and formality coincident with enhanced agency law enforcement
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activity and heightened damages in the tribunals gave rise to a dispute
resolution movement in Britain. 
4.5. The Emerging British Dispute Resolution Movement
The 1998 Act was the most significant legislative accomplishment of the
nascent British dispute resolution movement within employment law. It
would be followed by the Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules
of Procedure) Regulations 2001 and the Employment Act 2002 (the 2002
Act). Unlike the US version, which quickly resorted to private dispute
resolution to meet its ends, the UK movement has concentrated on tin-
kering with the formal system, seeking to ‘streamline’ the tribunals, or
‘encourage’ dispute resolution within the workplace. Although the voic-
es of discontent contributing to the movement come from a variety of
quarters – lawyers, tribunal chairs, academics, and business90 – the gov-
ernment policy agenda appears to have fallen under the influence of
employer interests. Initially, the 1998 Act took the balanced approach of
making it easier for the tribunals to manage their caseload, by allowing
chairs to act without lay members, permitting hearings on documents
alone, and facilitating settlement.91 By the 2001 regulations, however,
attention had turned to discouraging ‘misconceived’ or ‘unreasonable’
claims, by allowing a tribunal chair, at a ‘pre-hearing review’, to require
a £500 bond from a claimant upon a finding that the case had little chance
of success.92 This policy of making tribunal claims go away reached its
full fruition with the 2002 Act’s introduction of controversial mandatory
workplace grievance, discipline, and dismissal procedures, making it
possible to exclude applicants from the tribunals if they failed to exhaust
employer dispute resolution arrangements.93
Just as changing the inputs to the tribunal system in pursuit of the
SCP, without considering dispute resolution, can have unwanted effects,
so undoubtedly manipulating the dispute resolution mechanisms with an
eye only to DRP objectives can limit the effectiveness of those mecha-
nisms for SCP purposes. A particularly egregious example of this phe-
nomenon results from the 2001 tribunal procedure regulations. Their
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measures for sifting weak claims make it easier (a) to strike out – or dis-
miss – a claim at any point in the tribunal process, and (b) to find that a
claim has a sufficiently limited chance of success that the claimant must
post a bond or be struck out. The raised bond maximum of £500 is quite
a significant amount to a person on a £15,000 a year salary, whose week-
ly pre-tax pay just exceeds £300. The combination of new criteria and a
higher bond has had the immediate effect of cutting the proportion of dis-
crimination claims to reach a tribunal hearing by nearly a third.94 The
number of missing hearings corresponds with a commensurate burgeon-
ing of struck-out claims. 
The strike-outs do not appear to have come from among cases that
conciliate, or cases that withdraw: those numbers remained consistent.95
The regulations have ruthlessly accomplished their aim of thinning out
clogged tribunal diaries, which would raise no concerns if the missing
hearings represented deadweight, frivolous claims. However, if that were
the case, one would expect claimant win rates to increase. Unfortunately,
no evidence suggests that this has happened.96 The most charitable inter-
pretation is that cases that formerly went to tribunal hearings experienced
pressure to settle, and some cases that would otherwise settle were struck
out for failure to post a bond, or some similar reason. However, no obvi-
ous ground exists to prefer that interpretation over one that has the tri-
bunals now dismissing claims that might otherwise go on to strike a blow
for change. It seems unlikely that proponents of measures to streamline
tribunal procedures would, wearing social change hats, favour reducing
the number of successful deterrent messages sent through the tribunals.
However, wearing their dispute resolution hats, they might have accom-
plished just that. It should surprise nobody if, after the 2002 Act’s griev-
ance, discipline, and dismissal procedures have had time to settle in, yet
more potential opportunities to send messages and influence conduct get
ground down by internal employer procedures, or barred from the tri-
bunals for technical failures to exhaust the statutory procedures.
Whether or not, as a matter of fact, the recent dispute resolution
reforms actually undermine the British social change project is again not
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the primary point. What matters more is the fact that the UK scheme for
regulating employment discrimination, like that of the US before it, has
fostered a state of opposition between the two projects. It has done this
by using the tribunals, clearly designed and suited to dispute resolution,
as the central mechanism to apply pressure for social change. The inputs
of strategic litigation and the rising stakes of discrimination claims have
contributed to a change in the functioning of the tribunals sufficient to
provoke a strong reaction from users of the system. This reaction has
come in the form of a dispute resolution movement seeking to reduce tri-
bunal expense and delay as a matter of priority. In much the same way
that the social change project might introduce robust deterrent mecha-
nisms into the tribunal system without considering the impact of such a
move on tribunal accessibility, so the new dispute resolution project does
not take account of how its reforms might limit the effectiveness of anti-
discrimination legislation. This is the problem of the two projects. The
most important step in dealing with it is to acknowledge that it exists.
5. THE TWO PROJECTS AND THE REFORM OF BRITISH EQUALITY LAW
At a time when the currents of debate in equality law seem to flow inex-
orably toward dramatic reform through a single equality act, scholarship
and commentary in Britain have tended to ignore the two projects. The
problem often goes beyond mere silence on the subject, as many voices
call for measures inimical to accessible individual remedies,97 and some
even appear keen for Britain to outgrow its dispute resolution phase.98
Meanwhile, most of those who do talk about dispute resolution do so as
if what is good for individual claims must be good for the cause of equal-
ity.99 The CEHR White Paper gives no recognition to the two projects,
and promises to exacerbate existing tensions. This section will analyse
these features of the current discourse, looking first at how some of the
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most influential work in the field of UK equality law fails to engage with
the two projects. It will then turn to specific proposals for reform, reveal-
ing the CEHR White Paper as a missed opportunity, and making sugges-
tions as to how a single equality act could take both projects into account.
5.1. The Two Projects and Legal Scholarship on Reform in Britain
The British literature on reform of equality law has missed the real sig-
nificance of the two projects in at least three distinct ways: (1) failure to
recognise that there are two projects and that they might conflict; (2)
some recognition that two separate projects exist, but failure to appreci-
ate or deal with the fact that some measures to improve the effectiveness
of the social change project might harm the dispute resolution project;
and (3) awareness that social change aims can conflict with dispute reso-
lution aims, coupled with a flawed assumption that such conflict is an
inevitable part of progress, and that dispute resolution must give way to
a new paradigm. This section will discuss these three attitudes in turn. 
Several proposals do nothing worse than urge some action in regard to
improving the social change impact of the law, without mentioning or
appearing to put thought into any effects the measures might have on the
accessibility of claims for redress.100 Aileen McColgan’s Achieving
Equality at Work, for example, seeks to provide an up-to-date account of
the ‘state of play’, in equality law, and to suggest how current problems
might be resolved in a new single equality act.101 However, the chapter
devoted to ‘Enforcement and Remedies’ simply does not discuss what
effect her preferred ‘radical reforms’ might have on how claims proceed in
the tribunals.102 She does mention the problems claimants currently expe-
rience, and in fairness her proposals do not focus on deterrent litigation,
but she gives attention neither to measures calculated to improve individ-
ual remedies, nor to whether her proposals will undermine the current
arrangements. McColgan’s book pursues the social change project with
unquestionable rigour, but leaves dispute resolution to its own devices. 
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A specialised form of the ‘failure to recognise the two projects’ atti-
tude consists of efforts to identify a single, unifying principle that explains
what equality law seeks, or should seek, to accomplish. An example of this
is Hugh Collins’s thoughtful discussion of social inclusion as a theoretical
explanation for the proper aim of equality regulation.103 Collins does not
mention the impact of such an approach on the accessibility of individual
relief. In this he differs little from those who would put, for example, dig-
nity104 or diversity105 on the pedestal in place of social inclusion, as fun-
damental guiding principles. This kind of approach denies the existence of
a separate dispute resolution project, just as it denies that the social change
project might pursue social inclusion, dignity, and diversity in varying
measures.106 This temptation to see anti-discrimination law as having a
single objective might account for much of the failure to consider whether
the two projects pull the law in different directions.
Even those commentators who see that anti-discrimination law
involves separate dispute resolution and policy implementation objec-
tives appear blind to the systemic relationship between the two.107
Adherents of this ‘failure to recognise the systemic relationship’ attitude
call for high-stakes litigation inputs to the tribunals aiming to produce
deterrent outputs, without investigating what dispute resolution outputs
those inputs might generate. The Hepple Report provides a good exam-
ple of this phenomenon. This careful study, which explicitly pursues
social change project ends, considers the problems faced by individual
victims in seeking redress, and gives some thought to measures that
might improve their plight.108 However, without acknowledging a link,
and without recognising any conflict, the report recommends introducing
a bristling arsenal of US-style measures for enhancing deterrent pressure
and focusing diffuse interests in litigation.109 These are the very measures
that have driven US employment dispute resolution to private providers,
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and could have at least some detrimental effect in Britain. The report not
only does not acknowledge this possibility, but makes no reference to
having considered the impact of such measures on tribunal efficiency and
accessibility at all.
Although failing to recognise the systemic tensions between deter-
rence and dispute resolution in the tribunals leads to proposals inimical
to the dispute resolution project, the most worrying tendency is to view
dispute resolution as no more than a discredited, obsolete approach to
policy implementation. This third attitude actually recognises a potential
inconsistency between accessible individual remedies and robust social
change measures, but assumes that one must give way to the other.
Sandra Fredman, for instance, criticises the unsuitability of traditional
individual tribunal claims to the task of implementing a modern policy
agenda.110 She proposes, as a solution to the problem, that equality law
leave the old dispute resolution model behind. She favours taking ‘the
burden of litigation off the individual claimant altogether’,111 suggesting
that ‘discrimination law, by its very nature, requires a departure from the
traditional adversarial structure, even in the more informal setting of a
tribunal.’112 She does not appear to see the part of the dispute resolution
project that is an end in itself; for Fredman, individual rights vindication
has worn out its usefulness to the social change project, and must yield
to a new paradigm. 
Many other participants in the debate take some version of the view
that where dispute resolution loses its instrumentality in the fight against
inequality, it loses much of its raison d’être.113 Of course, reasonable
arguments exist for not attributing a high priority to the provision of a
cheap, quick, and accessible venue for victims of discrimination to seek
relief for their unique injuries. Moreover, none of the commentators cit-
ed here actually recommends eliminating individual tribunal claims. It is
possible fully to understand the two projects and how they interact, and
nevertheless to conclude that if the social change project needs to burden
the institution of individual claims in order to make equality a reality,
then so be it.114 If that is true, however, the conclusion should be based
on investigation, not assumption. Those who seek to leave dispute reso-
lution behind do not demonstrate that to defend accessible individual
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remedies is impracticable, or that to mount such a defence would neces-
sarily threaten the social change project. They also fail to acknowledge
overtly that an independent social good – the accessibility to individuals
of a forum for redress – has been considered and found to be in conflict
with, and of secondary importance to, one or more other social goods.
The reform discourse could avoid these three common oversights by
taking the following three steps. First, reformers should investigate
whether, with regard to a given proposal, the inputs to the system in pur-
suit of policy implementation will negatively change the dispute resolu-
tion outputs of the system. Second, if there will be negative effects,
reformers must consider whether their aims could be met outside of the
dispute resolution system. This is very important: it asks reformers to
‘think outside the box’, and avoid habitual resort to existing dispute res-
olution mechanisms as the forum for law enforcement activities. Finally,
if the first two steps lead to the conclusion that the proposal must
unavoidably have a negative effect on the dispute resolution project, then
reformers should engage in a proportionality inquiry, demonstrating that
the degree of burden imposed on individual remedies is properly bal-
anced by the social change benefits of the proposal. Following these steps
could go a long way to assuring that measures to achieve social change
do not unnecessarily or accidentally undermine the accessibility of indi-
vidual remedies, while acknowledging that often group or societal con-
cerns must take precedence over those of the individual. 
5.2. The CEHR Consultation: How Not to Take Account of the Two 
Projects
If the movement for reform of British equality law marches irresistibly
toward rationalisation and harmonisation through a single equality act,
then surely the first steps in that campaign have been the consultation on
the creation of a single equality commission. Those who care about the
dispute resolution project must hope that those steps do not presage the
ultimate direction of the movement. Unfortunately, the CEHR consulta-
tion process has followed none of the steps proposed above, almost pro-
ducing results predictably inimical to the interests of non-strategic dis-
crimination victims in Britain. Of course, most of the questions addressed
in the consultation process did not have direct impacts on dispute resolu-
tion, so a critique of the full consultation falls well outside the scope of
this article. However, the consultation process could not avoid addressing
the issue of what role the new CEHR should play in the litigation of indi-
vidual claims, strategic or otherwise. How it did so exemplifies a policy-
making process that did not take account of the two projects, and shows
why discussions on a single equality act must not repeat the omission. 
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The question of CEHR representation of individuals (‘casework’)
arose because each of the existing commissions supports individual
claims to some degree or another, and each one to a different degree, so
a decision was required as to whether and to what extent the CEHR will
support individual claims. Government documents prepared to guide the
deliberations of the Task Force commissioned to advise the government
on such issues reported that the ‘primary route for enforcement of anti-
discrimination law is for the individual affected to seek redress through
the courts… The CEHR’s enforcement role needs to complement this.’115
The documents indicated that although a ‘full casework service’ would
have ‘a significant bearing on customer satisfaction levels’, it would be
‘at odds with the strategic approach of the CEHR.’116 Thus, according to
the government, the individual claims system had no significant prob-
lems that the CEHR need concern itself with. The only relevance of com-
mission support for individual claims was ‘customer satisfaction’, which
could not compete with issues of real concern, like strategic enforcement.
Based on such assumptions – Task Force documents reveal no actual
investigation of the priority of strategy or the unthreatened health of the
individual claims system – the Task Force documents recommended that
the CEHR provide support only where the case (1) is likely to clarify
important points of law, (2) affects large numbers of people or has ‘a sig-
nificant impact on one or more sectors’, (3) flags up a need for legisla-
tive change, or (4) involves some special circumstance justifying com-
mission support.117 The Task Force reports acknowledged that this would
constitute a retrenchment of commission support for individual
claims.118 Following on from the Task Force deliberations, the CEHR
White Paper had individuals receiving support only where their cases
‘raise a question of principle, affect large numbers of people, or flag up
the need for legislative change’, dropping any reference to ‘special cir-
cumstances’ (negative reaction eventually forced the government to drop
this proposal).119 In its regulatory impact assessment, the White Paper
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reckoned that ‘no costs to the individual’ would flow from the reduction
in commission assistance to individual claims.120
Nothing like any of the proposed three steps appeared in the process
by which the government reached that decision. Nowhere in the consul-
tation process did the government appear to have investigated whether its
proposals might affect the dispute resolution project beyond the obvious
diminution in support for some cases.121 The government did not explore
how, for example, emphasising support for strategic cases might raise
stakes in the tribunals or create a two-tiered system of relief. It did not
consider whether channelling CEHR law enforcement efforts away from
dispute resolution mechanisms, perhaps by strengthening the formal
investigation power, might make it possible to have separate enforcement
and dispute resolution branches within the CEHR.122 Most disappointing,
however, was the failure of the consultation process to inquire whether
the benefits of heightened emphasis on selective strategy justified the
concomitant loss of support for individual claims.
The CEHR Task Force document ‘Supporting Individuals’ represents
a neat piece of legerdemain on this issue. The report purported to consider
the different approaches of the EOC, CRE and DRC to the provision of
support for individual claims, with an eye toward choosing the right bal-
ance of strategy as against support. An annex to the report contained data
on the commissions’ casework activities.123 This data indicates that, for
example, the CRE provides tribunal or court representation to around eight
times the proportion of race claims that the EOC provides in proportion to
all sex and equal pay claims.124 However, despite the very different bal-
ances struck by these commissions between strategy and individual sup-
port, the text of the Task Force report described them both as ‘adopting a
highly selective process that reflects a strategic approach’, and sharing a
‘common view that resources are best deployed to support strategic priori-
ties.’125 With any distinctions thus airbrushed away, the report sets up three
options: full, limited, and no casework. The ‘limited’ option that splits the
two extremes is of course the anointed one, which when fleshed out looks
almost exactly like the EOC approach, and distinctly unlike the CRE
approach.126 In other words, the report manages to point to the very selec-
tive EOC model as preferable to that of the CRE without even trying to
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demonstrate that the strategic advantages achieved by the EOC outweigh
the lost benefits of the CRE’s support for individual claims.
The dispute resolution project deserves better than that. For decades
the CRE and EOC, with roughly the same statutory authority, have pur-
sued very different approaches. The CRE emphasised formal investiga-
tions and the resolution of individual disputes, while the EOC focused on
strategic litigation. It may well be that, on balance, the EOC model deliv-
ers the best social change return with an acceptable dispute resolution
cost, while the CRE model attempts too little policy implementation in
favour of helping a negligible number of individual discrimination vic-
tims. However, such superiority in approach, if extant, must be proven
after investigation of the systemic impacts of strategic emphasis on the
accessibility of individual remedies, and after the value of social change
dividends is weighed against the burden on rights vindication. Owing to
its failure to follow some variation on the proposed three steps, the CEHR
consultation process will have arrived at a decision about the balance of
strategy and individual support without having considered, for example,
whether strengthened formal investigation powers might free up some
commission resources for casework support, or whether a CRE-inspired
balance might achieve acceptable law enforcement outcomes while pre-
serving some role for the CEHR in helping victims gain redress. Because
the government backed down from its prescribed casework criteria, owing
to outraged responses to the CEHR White Paper, some of the potential
damage was avoided. The government and the participants in the consul-
tation nevertheless missed an opportunity here. The opportunity missed
was not so much the opportunity to have more CEHR support for indi-
vidual justice, but the opportunity to investigate and discuss whether that
would be a sufficiently valuable part of the CEHR mission to justify some
diminution in strategic impact, or a greater investment of resources.
5.3. How to Take Account of the Two Projects
The debate on a single equality act need not miss that kind of opportuni-
ty. Seizing the opportunity does not require adopting specific measures;
it only requires that reform proposals take proper account of the two proj-
ects. Some proposals, however, are more likely than others to advance the
social change project without harming dispute resolution. It is of course
beyond the scope of this article to apply a ‘three steps’ analysis to every
leading reform proposal, but one can abbreviate that process by looking
for ideas that seek to increase pressure for social change without using
the dispute resolution system. These include, for example, the imposition
of positive duties to promote equality, and deterrent or strategic litigation
channelled outside the tribunals.
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A persuasive champion of positive duties is Fredman, who recom-
mends that the social change project focus primarily on enforcing duties
on companies and public authorities to promote equality among their
employees and users.127 How these would work is best explained by
Fredman and others,128 but their primary attribute from a dispute resolu-
tion perspective is that enforcement need not involve the tribunals. The
CEHR could monitor compliance with positive duties backed by the threat
of an order from the county court.129 As long as a positive duty scheme
does not ask the tribunals to supervise, monitor, or enforce the duties, this
approach harbours no apparent threat to accessible and speedy individual
rights vindication. Evidence suggests that positive duties have a more reli-
able and demonstrable effect on the behaviour of the regulated than deter-
rence.130 If this proves true, it would allow the CEHR to consider dis-
pensing with strategic litigation, which could free it to take on a robust
dispute resolution role, and would at a minimum remove some high-stakes
inputs from the tribunal system. McColgan contributes the suggestion that
the positive duty scheme use labour unions, works councils, or other
forms of worker representative to help enforce and implement positive
duties.131 This addition appears unlikely to create any problems for indi-
vidual justice, and could be a fairer and more satisfying way of encourag-
ing workplace dispute resolution than compelling the use of employer-
administered discipline and grievance procedures. 
Of course, these approaches only accommodate the two projects if
they replace popular emphasis on deterrence through the tribunals. This
is not to suggest that class actions, high or punitive damages, or CEHR
test case litigation should not play a part in equality regulation. Each of
those enforcement tools has value to the dispute resolution project. Class
actions should be available for large groups of individuals with common
grievances who want to reduce the individual burden of litigation through
concerted action. High, though perhaps not punitive, damages must be
available in some cases to meet the dispute resolution project aim of ade-
quate and appropriate compensation. Even test case litigation serves the
dispute resolution project when it clarifies the law and makes actions for
individual relief run more smoothly. The challenge is to provide all the
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dispute resolution and social change benefits of such measures without
commandeering the employment tribunals to perform functions for
which they were not designed. 
The contemporary discourse boasts no proposals that meet this chal-
lenge directly. The CRE has long urged the government to create a dis-
crimination division in the tribunals, an idea that appears in a modified
form in the Hepple Report.132 This might ameliorate delay for non-dis-
crimination employment claims, but does not appear likely to eliminate
effects from high-stakes litigation. The Hepple Report, among others, rec-
ommends meeting the needs of individual victims of discrimination by
improving the availability of legal aid.133 Providing such aid is intended to
alleviate dispute resolution concerns, presumably so that reform of reme-
dies and enforcement can focus on the social change project without dis-
traction. However, the success of such a policy depends almost entirely on
the effects of any enforcement measures directed through the tribunals.
Thus, if class actions, CEHR strategic litigation, and exemplary damages
in the tribunals lead to US-style delay and legalism, even unlimited legal
aid will not eliminate formality or speed up the proceedings, and nobody
seriously proposes unlimited legal aid. While no proponent of the dispute
resolution project would resist improved legal aid for discrimination vic-
tims, such aid should not relieve reformers of the responsibility to con-
sider the impact of social change measures on dispute resolution.
Surprisingly, a proposal floated in 1987 provides the best solution for
removing heightened stakes from the tribunals. A report from Justice
suggested that the most complex or generally significant of employment
cases, around 10 per cent, should go to a new ‘Employment Court’,
referred there on the discretion of tribunal chairs.134 This kind of
approach could accommodate both projects by preserving the tribunals
for quick, cheap, and informal individual rights vindication, while allow-
ing strategic cases to strike blows for social change in a forum suited to
that enterprise. From a resource perspective this arrangement makes
more sense for discrimination law than for employment law. General
employment law does not involve nearly enough social policy imple-
mentation to justify a separate court. However, if a new equality act were
to direct all discrimination claims to the employment tribunals, as the
Hepple Report recommends, an ‘Equality Court’ might make financial
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sense where an ‘Employment Court’ did not. Indeed, if reform goes as far
as it should – extending anti-discrimination protection beyond employ-
ment to education, goods, and services provision, across sex, race, dis-
ability, religion, sexual orientation, age, and as yet unspecified grounds –
one can see how the tribunals could only hope to provide quick and
accessible remedies to all victims of discrimination if an Equality Court
were there to handle complex, large-scale, or high damages equality cas-
es with their more far-reaching policy implications.
Any such reforms must of course satisfy EC law. Procedural arrange-
ments cannot, for example, make it easier to vindicate domestic rights
than EC rights, attach inferior remedies to EC rights, or impose an insuf-
ficient sanction (for deterrent purposes) for the violation of EC law.135
Fortunately, an Equality Court for representative (or class), sector-wide,
and CEHR-prosecuted litigation need not have the effect of providing
more or less protection to EC rights. Channelling cases to the forum best
suited to dealing with the characteristics (e.g. relative complexity versus
simplicity, single-party versus multi-party) of each case would cut across
domestic/EC law lines, and has no obvious tendency to discriminate
between the two (unless of course the argument could be made that EC
law is inherently more or less complex than British law). Similarly, a
CEHR mission stressing enforcement of positive duties, strategic litiga-
tion in the Equality Court, and a renewed individual casework role would
be completely consistent with the vision of an equality body found in EC
directives.136
Respecting the two projects requires a regulatory scheme that pur-
sues social change through institutions and procedures designed for that
purpose, and provides dispute resolution in forums suited to the resolu-
tion of individual claims for relief. The reform discourse in Britain has
not acknowledged this claim up to now, and the most recent move toward
harmonising anti-discrimination enforcement through the CEHR has
missed an opportunity to accommodate the two projects. The impending
debate on the content of a new single equality act can remedy these omis-
sions by mainstreaming the two projects into reform discussions, and by
choosing measures that implement policy through means other than the
employment tribunals and other dispute resolution mechanisms. The ide-
al suite of proposals features CEHR emphasis on positive duties, the
establishment of an Equality Court to administer deterrent, group, and
test case litigation, and a healthy provision for legal aid to the victims of
discrimination.
6. CONCLUSION
Equality law in Britain is at a crucial juncture, where calls for reform lead
ever closer to a single equality act. Blueprints for a new act would extend
the scope of anti-discrimination protection – increasing the potential
number of claims for relief in the process – and would direct all existing
and additional discrimination claims, even those involving provision of
education, goods, and services, to the employment tribunals. If the
reform movement intends to ask the tribunals to provide for the resolu-
tion of all discrimination claims, it must recognise and resist the tenden-
cy to expect the tribunals to serve the ends of two separate and often con-
flicting projects. When the project to promote social change with regard
to equality appropriates for its purposes mechanisms originally designed
for the resolution of straightforward employment disputes, it runs the risk
of rendering those mechanisms unfit for the needs of the dispute resolu-
tion project. This risk has become a reality in the US, where the heedless
pursuit of social change through the dispute resolution system has driven
all but a handful of discrimination victims to private ADR. Signs of a par-
allel trend have emerged in Britain, making it imperative that the debate
over a single equality act take care to respect the individual dispute reso-
lution function of the tribunals and, where possible, avoid making them
the primary forum for social policy implementation. The fight against
inequality in society must at times take precedence over individual inter-
ests where a clash is unavoidable, but the accessibility of avenues for
individual rights vindication must not be ignored or taken for granted. 
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